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CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY REGULATION
OF
PRIVATE COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES
DR. PHILIP J. FACCENDA*
KATHLEEN Ross**
INTRODUCTION

In March of 1974 the President of the National Association
of College and University Attorneys, Dr. Norman L. Epstein, said:
That the Academy has become litigious is by now a circumstance too pronounced to be disputed. Those administrators who are not aware of the increased litigation
by direct involvement in it, are aware of its incidence
through any of the several publications which daily come
over their desks.'
Institutions of higher education both public and private,
whose contacts with the courts were for all practical purposes
limited to their business relationships with those outside the university, have in recent years seen a dramatic increase in judicial and administrative review of their internal policies. Most of
this increased scrutiny can be ascribed to the federal government's
desire to protect the constitutional rights of the individuals within,
whether student, faculty or employee. The federal government
has enforced this policy by way of federal court decisions which
protect the constitutional rights of the individual and mandate
action by the college or university, as well as with decisions by
executive and administrative federal agencies empowered by Congress to enforce statutes either directly or by the withholding of
federal subsidy.
Our purpose in this article is to consider the main thrust of
these recent developments for the benefit of the administrators
*B.S.M.E., University of Notre Dame, 1951; J.D., Loyola University, 1957.
Dr. Faccenda came to Notre Dame in 1967 as Special Assistant to the President; in 1970, he assumed his present position as General Counsel to the
University.
**Third-year student, University of Notre Dame Law School; Research
Assistant.
1. Address by Norman L. Epstein, Vice Chancellor and General Counsel
of the California State University & Colleges, at the National Conference
of the American Association for Higher Education, March 12, 1974.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1975

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 9, No. 3 [1975], Art. 4

540

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 9

of private institutions, setting forth the exceptions presently applicable to private institutions and not enjoyed by public institutions. The authors will attempt to substantiate their conviction
that private institutions would be well advised to comply voluntarily with laws which admittedly only apply to the public institutions, because to do so will allow an orderly transition and
prevent the risk of stricter enforcement which always attends an
unfavorable judicial determination.
The authors have
readers to master the
sources listed to assist
on their own the basic

used footnotes extensively to enable lay
essential ideas from the text, with the
college and university counsel to research
sources of our conclusions.

CONSTITUTIONAL REGULATION OF PRIVATE
COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES JURISDICTION

The overwhelming majority of the decisions involving constitutional rights have involved public institutions because, as
agencies of a state, their actions are normally "actions of the
state" and subject to the protection of the fourteenth amendment.'
It should be noted that the word "decision" is used with precision since we do not know how many actions have been brought
in federal court against private institutions and found wanting
for jurisdiction, because such cases are not generally reported.
The critical issue in litigation brought by individuals against
private schools is jurisdiction.3
Traditionally, suits against private educational institutions
have been contract, tort or property actions. An individual alleging that a private educational institution has deprived him of his
constitutional rights must show that the institution acted on behalf of the state-as an arm of the state, which if proven, subjects the private school to the jurisdiction of federal court. As a
result, in nearly every suit against a private school, the plaintiff
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. This amendment provides:
[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
3. Jurisdiction can be defined as the authority by which courts and
judicial officers take cognizance of, and decide cases. See generally Mobil
Oil Corp. v. Kelley, 493 F.2d 784 (5th Cir. 1974); Stone & Adler, Inc. v.
Cooper, 20 Ill. App. 3d 576, 315 N.E.2d 56 (1974); Kaelin v. University of

Pittsburgh, 421 Pa. 220, 218 A.2d 798 (1966).
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alleges that the actions of the institution were those of the state."
If state action is not shown, a private school can be sued only as
an individual citizen and the reservoir of constitutional protections and procedural tools available when the private school is
sued as an agent of the state are not available to the plaintiff."
Historically, the courts have been reluctant to interfere in controversies arising between individuals and institutions of higher
education and therefore have rarely made a finding of state action.' This policy was established in 1934, when the United States
4. See Hendrickson, State Action and Private HigherEducation, 2 J. LAW
& EDUC. 53 (1973), wherein it is stated:
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution specifies that the
states cannot deny certain rights guaranteed under the due process and
equal protection clauses. A corporation as well as a private citizen
generally does not come under the ambit of Fourteenth Amendment
responsibilities. However, state action, a concept derived from that
Amendment, deals with a connection between the state and the
private individual which so insinuates the state into the affairs of
the private sector that it is made into an agency of the state subject to
the Fourteenth Amendment.
5. Once the private school's actions have been determined to be state
actions, constitutional challenges against the institution can be maintained.
Most such allegations are brought under the fourteenth amendment and claim
a denial of the rights to due process or equal protection. First, however, the
plaintiff must satisfy the court that the denial has resulted from action of
a governmental or quasi-governmental body. Public school actions are certainly state action within the fourteenth amendment of the United States
Constitution.
The acts of a private educational institution may be state actions if a
certain degree of governmental involvement is shown:
That is to say, when private individuals or groups are endowed by
the State with powers or functions governmental in nature, they become agencies or instrumentalities of the State and subject to its
constitutional limitations.
Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966).
6. For an instance in which a court did find "state action" on the part
of a private college, see Buckton v. National Collegiate Athletic Assoc.,
366 F. Supp. 1152 (D. Mass. 1973). Buckton involved a suit brought by
private university ice hockey players seeking to enjoin the university and the
NCAA from declaring them ineligible for intercollegiate sports due to their
former participation on Canadian major junior A hockey teams. Plaintiffs
alleged, inter alia, a deprivation of their constitutional rights under the
fourteenth amendment. The federal district court concluded that state action
did exist on the part of the private university and hence recognized plaintiffs'
fourteenth amendment claim. The court reasoned that the university,
[t]hough a private institution, clearly performs functions governmental in nature, such as providing higher education to and exercising substantial dominion over its students. It may be constrained,
therefore, by the requirements of the constitution.
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Supreme Court in Hamilton v. Regents of the University of Cali;

fornia" declared that school administrators possess inherent authority to establish standards for the internal organization and
governance of their institutions. So long as courts are hesitant
to assume jurisdiction over private institutions, they will be saved
an enormous amount of potential litigation; once the jurisdic-

tional barrier is broken, however, and precedent established for
assertion of federal jurisdiction, private institutions can look
forward to increased litigation, but without the protective shield
of sovereign immunity which state colleges and universities enjoy."
JurisdictionalRequirements
As has already been indicated, proof of state action by a

private school is essential if the suit is to be brought in federal
366 F. Supp. at 1156. The court also stressed the fact that the university had
received funding from both the state and federal governments. "State support to these defendants, through any arrangement, management, funds, or
property would inject state action into their conduct." 366 F. Supp. at 1156.
This decision is clearly contrary to the majority of cases however. Most
courts have held that a mere showing of receipt of government aid does not
ipso facto indicate the existence of state action. Thus, the District Court for
the Southern District of New York has recently held that the "[R]eceipt of
money from the state is not without a good deal more, enough to make the
recipient an agent or instrumentality of government." Grossner v. Trustees
of Columbia Univ., 287 F. Supp. 535, 547 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). See also Blackmun
v. Fisk Univ., 443 F.2d 121 (6th Cir. 1971); Counts v. Voorhees College,
439 F.2d 723 (4th Cir. 1971); Browns v. Mitchell, 409 F.2d 593 (10th Cir.
1969); Powe v. Miles, 294 F. Supp. 1269 (W.D.N.Y. 1968), modified, 407
F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968).
For other recent cases which have refused to recognize state action on the
part of a private university, see Robinson v. Davis, 447 F.2d 753 (4th Cir.
1970) ; Coleman v. Wagner College, 429 F.2d 1120 (2d Cir. 1970).
7. 293 U.S. 245 (1934).
8. The eleventh amendment to the United States Constitution protects any
state from suit by a private citizen in the federal courts. The amendment
provides:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by citizens of another State, or by citizens
or subjects of any Foreign State.
U.S. CONST. amend. XI. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), surmounted this
eleventh amendment barrier for injunctive relief by use of the fiction that
when a state official acts unconstitutionally, he is stripped of his official
capacity. But this fiction has not been extended to suits against state officials
where money damages or restitutions have been sought. Edelman v. Jordan,
415 U.S. 651 (1974). In that case, the Court held that the eleventh amendment barred retroactive welfare payments.
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court." Once state action has been established, the federal courts
enter the dispute when a violation of federal constitutional rights
has been shown. 0 Yet, when seeking to find state action in
disputes between individuals and institutions, the courts remain
cautious.
Recently an individual argued that a private university, because of federal funds and public interest in education, was bound
because of these state actions to afford its employees their rights
guaranteed by the federal and state constitutions. The court rejected this line of reasoning:
The plaintiff suggests that there is a recent trend in the
law binding private institutions to constitutional standards previously applied only to state institutions. It is
doubted that there is a recent trend in the law as the
plaintiff suggests. There are a number of recent cases
holding unequivocally that private institutions are not
bound by constitutional standards for the protection of
private persons and institutions unless there are strong
indications of state control."
State Action
The jurisdictional barrier prohibits, or at least makes it very
difficult, for a plaintiff to bring suit against a private school in
a federal court. The strength of that barrier lies primarily in
the vagueness of exactly what will be considered state action. A
9. The first instance when state action was suggested (albeit unsuccessfully) on the part of a private educational institution was Guillory
v. Administrators of Tulane University, 212 F. Supp. 674 (E.D. La. 1962).
Several black students who were fully qualified but denied admission to
Tulane University, asked for injunctive relief on the theory that they could
not be constitutionally excluded from Tulane solely on the basis of race.
The* Court held that the fourteenth amendment limits its application to
states and the courts have no right to interfere when private individuals
choose to discriminate.
Indubitably the Tulane Board is free to act as it wishes since neither
this nor any other court may exercise its power to enforce racial
restrictions in private covenants.
212 F. Supp. at 687. Earlier cases emphasized the contractual relationship
between individuals and a private university as a basis for jurisdiction.
10. The fourteenth amendment expressly proscribes state action only.
Likewise, the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1974), which proscribes deprivation of any federal constitutional or statutory right, is concerned
only with state action.
11. Culver v. Hamline, 2d Judicial District, Minn., Nov. 19, 1974.
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precise definition of state action has never been formulated."
Moreover, the courts have declined to develop a definition:
[T]o fashion and apply a precise formula for recognition of state responsibility . . . is an impossible task
which this Court has never attempted.... [0] nly by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the non-obvious
involvement of the State in private conduct be attributed
its true significance. 3
The courts will evaluate, individually, the actions of a private institution to determine whether state action is present. The
only guidance a plaintiff contemplating suit against a private institution can find in determining whether the private institution's actions will be considered state actions is an examination
of precedent for similar fact situations.
Generally, the actions of a private institution are held to be
state actions when the private institution is an integral part of
the public purpose or when the state has such an active role in
the private institution that the state is deemed to have "so insinuated itself into a position of interdependence""' with the private institution that it must be recognized as a joint participant
in the challenged activity.
Plaintiffs have suggested diverse theories for proving state
action by private schools: state funding, 5 state control,"' and the
12. See Brownley v. Gettysburg College, 338 F. Supp. 725, 726 (M.D.
Pa. 1972).
13. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
14. See generally id.; Browns v. Mitchell, 409 F.2d 593, 595 (10th Cir.
1969); Penny v. Kalamazoo Christian High School Association, 48 Mich. App.
614, 210 N.W.2d 893, 895 (1973).
15. See, e.g., Browns v. Mitchell, 409 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1969) (state
funding found not to constitute state action); Powe v. Miles, 294 F. Supp.
1269 (W.D.N.Y. 1968), modified, 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968) (state funding
found not to constitute state action); Grossner v. Trustees of Columbia
Univ., 287 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (state funding found not to constitute state action). But, state funding has on occasion been found to constitute state action in cases not involving private schools. See, e.g., Sams v.
Ohio Valley General Hosp. Ass'n., 413 F.2d 826 (4th Cir. 1969) (hospital);
Eaton v. Grubbs, 329 F.2d 710 (4th Cir. 1964) (hospital).
16. See, e.g., Coleman v. Wagner College, 429 F.2d 1120 (2d Cir.
1970); Sigerson v. Sarah Lawrence College, - F. Supp. -,
(S.D.N.Y. Sept.
1978).
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granting of tax exempt status" by the government. It is not evident in the decisions what degree and type of governmental participation would prompt a finding of state action. But an examination of the cases clearly shows that state or federal funds flowing to a private institution without other direct involvement does
not create government action.'" Grossner v. Trustees of Columbia
University indicates that "receipt of money from the State
is not, without a good deal more, enough to make the recipient
an agency or instrumentality of the Government."'" Broderick v.
Catholic University of America suggests that:
Although money and tax considerations are given to defendant, this is a far cry from any influence on policy
or decision making or the encouragement of any specific
policy."
To date, no court has found sufficient influence as suggested
by Broderick or the "good deal more" required in Grossner in
addition to state funding, that would support a conclusion that the
private institution was indeed involved in state action.
Similarly, exemption from taxation does not transform a private university into a state institution.2 ' Nor does action by a
private entity become state action merely because the private
entity receives some benefit or service from the state or is subject to regulation.2 Even state regulation such as sanitary regulations and controlling the certification of teachers, when considered in conjunction with tax exempt status, is not sufficient
entanglement with the government to constitute state action.2
Rather it is considered as "[tihe State . . . merely exercising a
legitimate interest in the education of children."
Likewise, the
state's grant of property to assist the construction of an educa17. See, e.g., Blackburn v. Fisk Univ., 443 F.2d 121 (6th Cir. 1971),
where the court stated: "State involvement sufficient to transform a 'private'
university into a 'state' university requires more than merely . . .granting
... tax exemptions ...

"

Id.

at 123. Browns v. Mitchell, 409

F.2d 593

(10th Cir. 1969).
18. Broderick v. Catholic University of America, 365 F. Supp. 147
(D.D.C. 1973). See also note 6 supra.
19. 287 F. Supp. 535, 547 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
20. 365 F. Supp. 147, 155 (D.D.C. 1973).
21. See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
22. See, e.g., Penny v. Kalamazoo Christian High School Ass'n., 48
Mich. App. 614, 210 N.W.2d 893 (1973).
23. See, e.g., Family Forum v. Archdiocese of Detroit, 347 F. Supp.
1167 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
24. Id. at 1171.
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tional facility has not been considered sufficient state involvement to convert its action from a private one into state action.2
The plaintiff in Furumoto v. Lyman, 6 sought to prove state
action by showing that the private institution, Stanford University, performs a public function-higher education, which the
state would otherwise have to provide, thus making the action of
the private university governmental in nature. The opinion is
possibly the most tolerant view to date of governmental participation in a private school which did not result in a finding of
state action:
A finding of general state action here would require
more than an accumulation of the state benefits or regulations cited by plaintiffs. These factors do not establish
state control or the inherently governmental nature of
the University. Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that
Stanford is controlled by the state of California or that
Stanford does not have a substantial sphere of private,
independent authority and initiative. The State's grant
to Stanford of corporate powers and privileges is not
evidence of State control. The State has thus merely
given Stanford substantially the same corporate powers
and privileges given to any corporation formed under
its laws.2 '
Cracks In the JurisdictionalBarrier
Two cases decided in late 1973 found state action on the
part of private universities in suits brought by collegiate athletes seeking redress for alleged violations of their constitutional
rights. 8 The first case to find state action on the part of a private university, Buckton v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, 9 involved the rights of two Canadian nationals to play ice
hockey for Boston University following a declaration of their ineligibility by the NCAA. The court found that Boston University had become so permeated with a governmental character
that its actions were indeed the actions of the state and subject
to the constitutional limitations placed upon state action:
25.

See Grafton v. Brooklyn Law School, 478 F.2d 1137 (2d Cir. 1973);

Blackmnun v. Fisk Univ., 443 F.2d 121 (6th Cir. 1971).
26. 362 F. Supp. 1267 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
27. Id. at 1278.
28. Howard University v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 367 F.
Supp. 926 (D.D.C. 1973); Buckson v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 366
F. Supp. 1152 (D. Mass. 1973).

29. 366 F. Supp. 1152 (D. Mass. 1973).
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol9/iss3/4
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[Boston University], though a private institution clearly
performs functions governmental in nature, such as providing higher education to and exercising substantial dominion over its students. It may be constrained, therefore, by the requirements of the Constitution . . . Moreover, state support of these defendants through any arrangement, management, funds or property, would inject
state action into their conduct."
The court in Buckton chose to overlook the Broderick' requirement
of governmental influence on policy and the cumulative weight of
factors suggested by Grossner."1
Less than a month later, Howard University and a foreign
soccer player, who had been declared ineligible by the NCAA,
sued the NCAA for denial of plaintiff-athlete's right to due
process and equal protection.3 The court found that while the
NCAA is a voluntary, non-profit association, its influence and
activities are national in scope and fifty percent of its membership is comprised of state-supported institutions. Because of its
membership in this organization, state action was attributed to
Howard University:
Under all of these circumstances, while Howard [University] is not itself a governmental institution, its athletic affairs and related educational policies are affected
by the concerted action of the many state and federal
institutions that participate as NCAA members in the
promulgation and enforcement of the Association's rules,
regulations and procedures. This involvement by state
and federal institutions is pervasive and bears directly
upon the subject matter of the complaint. The actions
of these institutions, in short, caused the alleged injuries. Thus, government action is clearly shown and
the Court has jurisdiction."'
It appears that the rationale for finding state action on the
part of Howard University came not so much from the University's own actions, but rather, from the University's identity with
the NCAA, whose membership clearly showed involvement with
the state.
30.
81.
32.
33.
84.

Id. at 1156.
365 F. Supp. 147 (D.D.C. 1973).
287 F. Supp. 635 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
Howard University v. NCAA, 367 F. Supp. 926 (D.D.C. 1973).
Id. at 929.
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Plaintiffs seeking to show state action by a private institution should use caution, relying on Buckton and Howard only
when the school can be shown to be affiliated with or controlled
by a body that is itself subject to governmental control and its
actions therefore those of the state. This chain-link approach,
although available to show state action only in a narrow set of
facts, provides an alternative to the individual scrutiny of private actions which courts have previously relied upon and in which
state action was unpredictable, seldom found, and never defined.
Caution must also be employed in any utilization of Buckton; for,
as has been shown, this case is contrary to well-established
precedent.
STATUTORY REGULATION OF PRIVATE COLLEGES
AND UNIVERSITIES

Federal Regulations
Private institutions of higher education, like many other social institutions, are becoming aware of the demands of an expanded relationship with the federal government. Most of the
recent federal regulations require greater accountability for, and
commitment to, social programs. While universities and colleges
have always been committed to social progress, government regulations demanding accountability necessitate organization on an
institution-wide basis for a result-oriented program, rather than
on a departmental basis as has been the custom.
The last fifteen years have fostered vast governmental campaigns to improve the plight of the American worker." Federal
regulation in the areas of equal employment opportunity," wage
and hour control3" and occupational safety and health" has caused
greater involvement by the executive departments and agencies
of government in the affairs of educational institutions than has
been the case until recently.
Private colleges and universities come within the scope and
authority of federal regulation in these areas since they are by
35.

FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND THE EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES OF COLLEGE5

AND UNIVERSITIES (published by National Ass'n of College and University
Business Officers, 1974).

36. Civil Right Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e (1974).
37. Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1965).
38.

The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 651

(1975).
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definition "employers"." Some private educational institutions,
particularly the larger colleges and universities because they are
government contractors, are subject to even more comprehensive
federal regulation. The executive branch of the federal government has shown a marked desire to use the existence of federal
subsidies as a springboard for federal regulation, not only of the
programs subsidized, but of all programs within the institution.
Thus the government is able to regulate the racially and sexually discriminatory policies, for example, of private schools even
though the area in which the race or sex issue arises may be entirely separate from the area pertaining to the contract.
Since private colleges and universities have traditionally led
the way toward voluntary social reform, accomplishing the objectives of the various federal regulations presents no major difficulty. Indeed, most of the objectives have probably long been
routine practices for educational institutions. Literal compliance
with federal regulations does present a problem for private colleges and universities, however, because of the additional staff
and facilities necessary to maintain the oppressive volume of
records and control mechanisms required by the executive and
administrative orders. "
Executive Orders
Vast areas of governmental control over private institutions
come by way of executive orders. Private colleges are subject
to the authority of executive orders because of the jurisdictional
boundaries established within each individual order. For example, Executive Order 11246"' with its consequent legal and prac39. Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e (1974),
originally applied only to private employers. In 1972, it was amended to promote equal employment opportunities by extending coverage to state and
municipal employees and educational institutions. See also the Fair Labor
Standard Act's definition of employer, 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) and that found
in the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 652(5) (1975).
40. All federal regulations to date include sweeping penalties: imposition of heavy fines, sizable financial awards to aggrieved parties and suspension or cancellation of federal contracts. The practical effect of such
penalties is to make compliance inevitable.
41. Executive Order 11246 (Affirmative Action) was signed by President Johnson in 1965. This order prohibited discrimination on the basis of
race, color, religion or national origin in employment and required affirmative action on the part of all contractors. Amended by Executive Order
11375 in 1967 to add sex as a prohibited basis for discrimination, this regulation is enforced by HEW. Detailed guidelines for the Order have been
issued by the Office of Federal Contract Compliance of the Department of

Labor, 41 C.F.R. § 60 (1973).
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tical problems applies to institutions of higher education with individual federal contracts or subcontracts in excess of $10,000 " .
The enforcement jurisdiction extends to all federal contracts with
institutions of higher education, regardless of their source.
This order was expanded on January 13, 1973" to require
all educational institutions with one or more federal contracts of
$50,000 or more and fifty or more employees to maintain a
written affirmative action plan."" Even though the written plan
is not required unless all the jurisdictional requirements mentioned are met, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
advise maintenance of such a written plan, since responding to
individual and class complaints would be much more difficult
without a concrete program."'
The Employment Standards Administration of the Department of Labor published final rules in June, 1974"' requiring
federal contractors and subcontractors to take affirmative action
for the employment of the mentally and physically handicapped,
including out-reach and positive recruitment. All institutions
holding government contracts or subcontracts exceeding $2,500
will be subject to this ruling. 7 Additionally, contractors with
agreements providing for performance in ninety days or more
must establish an affirmative action program, publish it, and
designate an official responsible for the program and permit
Labor Department inspections. 8 Contracts with agreements of
$500,000 or more must submit a written affirmative action program within ninety days after the contract is awarded. "9
Title VII
Private educational institutions, being "employers," are subject to the equal employment opportunity provisions of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964."° Title VII is the major federal
statute designed to provide all persons an equal opportunity for
42.

Id.

43.

41 C.F.R. § 60-2.1 (1973).

44.
45.

Id.
Hanson, Executive Order 11246, as Amended, FEDERAL REGULATIONS

(1973).
46. Pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 793(a)
(1975), regulations were enacted setting forth the duties of subcontractors and
contractors under the Act. 20 C.F.R. § 741 (Supp. 1974).

AND THE EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES OF COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES

47. Id.
48.
49.
50.

Id.
Id.
42 U.S.C. §2000-e (1964), as amended, (Supp. III, 1973).
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meaningful employment, regardless of race, religion, color, sex
or national origin. Although educational institutions were not
previously within the act, the 1972 amendment"1 included virtually
all employers who employ fifteen or more full-time employees. 2
The impact of sudden inclusion within Title VII illustrates
our contention that private institutions should strive to predict
those laws to which they may become subject and comply voluntarily to thereby avoid compulsion. As mentioned earlier, Title
VII as enacted in 1964 specifically exempted educational institutions. The 1972 amendment revoked that exemption and suddenly the law applied to private schools in its current state of
development.53 Private schools had to immediately assume a level
of development in their employment practices commensurate with
the law and without the eight-year build-up enjoyed by those employers included since the Act's inception in 1964. Had private
schools noted the application of Title VII to business employers
and voluntarily complied, the sudden inclusion would certainly
have been less traumatic and possibly not even necessary.
The application of many provisions of Title VII are speculative, since no cases involving universities or colleges have yet
gone to trial on the merits. But there is no apparent reason why
Title VII will be applied any differently to educational institutions than to other employers:
[E]mployment discrimination in the college or university setting is the same as employment discrimination
on the assembly line, or in the executive suite of any
major corporation, and must be dealt with in the same
manner. The root problems are the same ones that have
51. Id.
52. Under 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2 (1964), as amended, (Supp. III, 1973),
an employment practice, inter alia, is unlawful if it: 1) results in failure or
refusal to hire any individual because of such person's religion, color, sex

or national origin; 2) results in the discharge of any individual because
of such person's race, color, religion, sex or national origin; 3) differentiates
between individuals with respect to compensation terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of such person's race, color, religion, sex or
national origin; 4) limits, segregates, or classifies employees or applicants
for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect such
person's employment status, because of such person's race, color, religion, sex
or national origin.
53. Sape, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as Amended,
FEDERAL

VERSrrs,

REGULATIONS AND EMPLOYMENT

at 22 (1974).
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plagued other businesses and other employers, the conditions which have led to these problems5 are the same,
and the solutions cannot be far different. '
Private schools would be well advised, then, to look to litigation involving businesses. Recruitment, compensation, maternity,
health and retirement policies, as well as tenure, will likely be
the areas of greatest concern to educational institutions when
striving to comply with Title VII.
Revenue Procedures
The Internal Revenue Service, by issuing Revenue Procedures,
can bind private institutions. At the risk of jeopardizing their
tax exempt status, private instituions must comply. A recent
example of such compulsion is the Proposed Revenue Procedure55
setting forth guidelines and record keeping requirements for
determining whether private schools applying for exemptions
under §§ 501(a) and 501(c) (3) " of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954 not only have racially nondiscriminatory policies, but
whether this fact is known to the general public.
The Proposed Revenue Procedure notes that the Internal
Revenue Service has found the necessity for specific guidelines
because:
Service experience with private school operations has
shown a need for more specific guidelines to insure a
uniform approach to the determination whether a private school has a racially nondiscriminatory policy as to
students."'
To achieve this assurance, the procedure requires that every
exempt private school maintain for at least three years all ap54.
55.

Id.
40 Fed. Reg. 6991 (1975).

56.
(a) Exemption from taxation. An organization described in subsection (c) or (d) or section 401 (a) shall exempt from taxation under
this subtitle unless such exemption is denied under section 502, 503 or
504. ...
(c) List of exempt organizations.-The following organizations are
referred to in subsection (a) ... (3) Corporations, and any community
chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated exclusively for re-

ligious, charitable, scientific testing for public safety, literary or educational purposes, or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals. .

..

26 U.S.C. § 501(a), (c) (1967).
57. 40 Fed. Reg. 6991, 6992 (1975).
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plications for general admission, with rejections being annotated
to indicate the reason for rejection; requests for all forms of
financial aid and note of the amounts awarded or the reasons for
rejection; all applications for employment with an annotation of
the reason for rejection; all advertising; and copies of all contribution solicitations.58 This Revenue Procedure says that the
existence of a racially discriminatory policy with respect to faculty and administrative staff is evidence of a racially discriminatory policy toward students. Further, a school must be able
to show that none of its facilities and programs permit or encourage racial discrimination. Failure to maintain or produce the
required records and information will warrant the presumption
that the institution has failed to comply with the guidelines,5 a
presumption rebuttable only by clear and convincing evidence to
the contrary."0
Conflicting Regulations
Private colleges and universities are subject to the regulations of the Office of Civil Rights, the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare, the Office of Federal Contract Compliance of the Department of Labor, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the Internal Revenue Service. Each agency
generates guidelines, rules and regulations. Compliance is difficult
because of the complexity and duplicity of the programs developed by the various agencies, which are not always cognizant of
the objectives and programs of other federal agencies. For example, those colleges and universities considered federal contractors are subject to the affirmative action requirements of Executive Order 11246, requiring, inter alia, recruitment of minorities
and women. Yet, the supply of qualified minorities and women
cannot fill the present demand. An institution, then, when attempting to offer a high enough salary to attract these groups,
may well be simultaneously violating the Equal Pay Act 6 ' which
forbids paying higher salaries to minorities than to non-minorities. Similarly, the proposed Revenue Procedure of the Internal
Revenue Service could conflict directly with the recently passed
Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (Buckley
Amendment) 2 which encourages the disposal of unnecessary ma58.
59.

Id. at 6993.
Id.

60. Id.
61. Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1965).
62. Educational Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, § 88 Stat. 484.
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terials in student files. Indeed, the American Council of Education and other educational associates have indicated their disapproval of the Revenue Procedure guidelines, because the Internal Revenue Service is requiring duplicate records of information already required by another federal agency. It is entirely
reasonable for private educational institutions to assume then,
that many if not all federal rules and orders could be the subject of duplicate and diverging enforcement mechanisms from
competing agencies of government.
The National Labor Relations Board
Given the incredible rate at which private educational institutions have been swept within the jurisdiction of federal executive and administrative rulings, it is not surprising that issues
involving labor on private college campuses have suddenly taken
on the appearance of business corporation dealings. Faculty collective bargaining, staff unionism and the National Labor Relations Board have arrived in the last five years on private college
and university campuses to irreversibly alter attitudes and relationships within the private educational community.
After nineteen years of rigid abstention, the National Labor
Relations Board asserted jurisdiction in 1970 over "private, nonprofit colleges and universities whose operations have a substantial effect on commerce." 6 3 The employers, Cornell University
and Syracuse University, instituted the action by filing representation petitions seeking elections to determine the bargaining representatives of their non-academic employees. To justify the
Board's assertion of jurisdiction, the petitioners argued that the
operations and activities of educational institutions as a class,
and of Cornell and Syracuse Universities particularly, have an
overwhelming impact and effect on interstate commerce," and
that the operations of universities and colleges have increasingly
become matters of federal interest," in conjunction with the failure of the state to adequately recognize and legislate fair labor
relations practices within these institutions.'
63. Cornell University Lond Association of Cornell Employers--Libraries
et al. v. Syracuse University and Service Employees International Union
Local 200, AFL-CIO. 183 NLRB 829 (1970). So important was the breaking of this jurisdictional barrier in the labor area, that thirteen colleges and
universities submitted amicu8 curiae briefs supporting the Board's assertion
of jurisdiction, while eleven colleges and universities presented briefs in
opposition to NLRB assumption of jurisdiction.

Id. at 332.
65. Id.
66. Id.
64.
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In support of their contention that the impact not only of
Syracuse and Cornell, but educational institutions as a class, upon
interstate commerce is significant, the employer-universities presented proof of their financial status, payroll, purchases and
government contracts."' This evidence was critical in the Board's
decision:
Petitioners introduced extensive evidence at the hearing
to document their claim that educational institutions as
a class have not only a substantial, but massive impact
on interstate commerce. After carefully examining all
the evidence submitted, we are compelled to conclude
that whatever guidance the 1947 Conference Report
provided to the situation which existed in 1951 when
Columbia University was decided, the underlying considerations no longer obtain two decades later. 8
This reversal of the NLRB's previous refusal of jurisdiction
does not signify a change in the statutes of the Board but, significantly, shows a philosophical change, since the Board could
have asserted jurisdiction in the Columbia University case nineteen years earlier:
[T] he activities of Columbia University affect commerce
sufficiently to satisfy the requirement of the statute and
the standards established by the Board for the normal
exercise of its jurisdiction . .. "

The National Labor Relations Board refused jurisdiction in
the Columbia University case because they did not believe that it
[w] ould effectuate the policies of the Act for the Board
to assert its jurisdiction over a nonprofit, educational
institution where the activities involved are noncommercial in nature and intimately connected with the charitable purposes and educational activities ... "
In the intervening decades, the Board has consistently declined jurisdiction over nonprofit universities if the activity under
scrutiny was noncommercial and intimately connected with the
school's educational purpose."'
The opinion of the NLRB candidly acknowledged that, al67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Trustees of Columbia University, 97 NLRB 424, 425 (1951).
70. Id. at 427.
71. Cornell University et al. v. Syracuse University and Service Employees Int. Union Local 200 AFL-CIO, 183 NLRB 329, 332 (1970).
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though education is still the primary goal of private educational
institutions, to achieve that end the private school has become
a business:
to carry out its educative functions, the university has
become involved in a host of activities which are commercial in character.7 2
To buttress this shift in approach to the Syracuse and
Cornell cases, the Board cited the financial status of private institutions of higher education: the operating budget of private
educational facilities was $6 billion in 1969; that of the $6 billion
revenue private educational institutions realized in fiscal 1966-67,
more than $1.5 billion came from government appropriations; that
private colleges and universities realized a commercial profit of
$70,678,000 from furnishing housing and food services in one
year;73 and that this "[i]ncome is derived not only from the
traditional sources such as tuition and gifts, but from the purely
commercial avenues of securities investments and real estate holdings."' Pivotal in the Board's decision to assert jurisdiction was
its recognition of increased federal financial participation in private educational institutions: "Another phenomenon clearly distinguishing the current situation from the one which existed in
1951 is the expanded role of the Federal Government in higher
education.""5
Although the Board declined to develop a jurisdictional standard for subsequent cases when it decided Syracuse and Cornell,
it asserted jurisdiction over private educational institutions because of the apparent need for such services in campus labor
disputes:
The evidence clearly established that universities are enlarging both their facilities and their economic activities
to meet the needs of mounting numbers of students.
Greatly increased expenditures by the Federal Government also testify to an expanding national interest in
higher education. . . . With or without Federal regulation, union organization is already a fait accompli at
many universities. As advancing waves of organization
swell among both nonprofessional and academic employ72.

Id.

73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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ees, it is unreasonable to assume that such disputes will
not continue to occur in the future."'
The consequences of Cornell and Syracuse are obviously farreaching. The assertion of jurisdiction by the NLRB is determined on a case-by-case dollar-volume standard, which should
lend itself to a degree of predictability. Surely the large universities will be within the jurisdiction of the Board; small institutions will not unless, of course, like Syracuse University, they are
the largest employer in the city where they are located.
Perhaps the greatest effect of Syracuse and Cornell is tangential. While struggling to bring their institutions within the
jurisdiction of the NLRB, these universities seemingly have shown
enough federal governmental involvement to strengthen the case
of those individual plaintiffs seeking to establish state action as
outlined above.
Collective Bargaining
Collective bargaining is yet another area where the outcome
in the public and private college spheres will diverge. State employees are not allowed in most states to engage in collective bargaining,"" while private colleges can undoubtedly expect an increase in such activity as faculties watch the gap between public
and private faculty salaries widen. Awareness of this disparity
stirs faculty desire to participate in the governance of the private institution. But in breaking out of their collegiate role and
pursuing unionization, faculties should be aware that traditional
industrial concepts may be applied to the working relationship
between the faculty and private colleges to create a business relationship heretofore not experienced between educational institutions and faculty.
CONCLUSION

Legal decisions, as most other matters encountered in college
and university governance, require careful balancing of competing rights and responsibilities. Yet, making the necessary legal
decisions is extremely difficult because in the present state of
development, college and university law is vague, unpredictable,
and in many instances conflicting.
76. Id.
77. Legislation (H.B. 1298, 1975) has currently been passed by the Indiana Senate and House of Representatives which, if signed into law, will
allow state employees to engage in collective bargaining.
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1975

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 9, No. 3 [1975], Art. 4

558

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9

Presently, a private college or university cannot even know,
prior to hearing, whether a federal court will assert jurisdiction
under the state action concept. Since this argument is but twelve
years old and the courts have insisted on making this jurisdictional judgment a case by case determination, college administrators, in viewing their alternatives, must not only gauge the outcome of their actions but also try to predict whether or not they
are within federal jurisdiction. The mere possibility of suddenly
being christened an arm of the state, and facing the need to immediately provide all of the constitutional guarantees to every
individual with whom the college has contacts, is nearly overwhelming.
College administrators can only hope to predict their state
action status by observing carefully case flow considering the
issue. Still, no private college will ever know for certain whether
or not it has become sufficiently entangled with the state to be
its representative until a court either declines or asserts jurisdiction-an oppressive price for certainty. Thus, it would seem
advantageous that the administrator of a private institution strive
wherever possible to provide the same constitutional protections
of the individual required by law at a public institution.
Evaluating the legal ramifications of a private college's actions is further complicated by the vagueness and conflicts within
so many of the laws affecting these institutions. This is particularly true of governmental regulations which are by nature broad
in scope and sweeping in effect. The applicability of most of
these rules and regulations to private colleges and universities
has not been tested in court. Until it is, or definitive guidelines issued, the uncertainty as to whether or not to respond and
the nature of that response must be among the factors considered
by private educational institutions. Again, private college administrators can guide their actions by being aware of analogous
cases involving public schools and the business world, on the assumption that private colleges will not be treated any differently.
Since the consequences of many legal decisions by private
colleges are unpredictable, as we have been able to show with a
few examples in this nondefinitive work, administrators would be
well advised to consult college counsel before significant decisions
are made. 8 Moreover, counsel might suggest policy changes that
78. Epstein, The Use and Misuse of College and University Counsel,
XIV JOURNAL OF HIGHER EDUCATION 635 (1974). In this article, Norman
Epstein presents an excellent discussion of the role of college and university
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would remove private colleges from the impact of certain rules.
Such preventative measures may be the ideal means for private
colleges to insure certainty in their legal decisions.
counsel. A careful reading by all college and university administrators,
and implementation of the suggestions made by Dr. Epstein is urged by the
authors.
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